Between April and August 1918, the New Zealand Division remained within the Amiens area. During this time the New Zealanders were not idle, with time spent either in their characteristic aggressive patrolling while in the front line, or in vigorous training while being rested. Russell was not overly happy with the performance of his Division, despite its achievements in helping to blunt the German offensive. He was of the view that his Division was too slow to get itself established on 26 March, and that it suffered more casualties as a consequence of this. He continued to demand high standards of thought and action from all in his Division, especially officers, whom he said had a clear responsibility of leadership.
From late August, the Division became one of the Allies' spearhead divisions, beginning with its seizure of Bapaume in the Battle of Amiens in late August, through to the Battle of the Sambre in November and the Division's final action – the capture of Le Quesnoy. During this period, the Division demonstrated its now customary efficiency in this new, more open, manoeuvring style of warfare. Its performance made it indistinguishable from a professional army division and illustrated how far the New Zealand Division had come from its amateur days on the slopes of Gallipoli. In this final phase of the war from April to November, the Division continued to suffer casualties.
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There is an increasing ferment of historical debate about aspects of World War I. One of these areas of debate surrounds the competence of the generals that directed the war and their relationship with their political masters. In particular, modern historiography has analysed the increasingly acrimonious relationship that evolved between Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, and Sir Douglas Haig, the British Commander-in-Chief. By the beginning of 1918, part of this acrimony had to do with how the war would be prosecuted. Haig remained convinced that the war would be won confronting the Germans on the Western Front, using a combination of massed infantry and artillery. Lloyd George preferred other options, such as pressing on other fronts against German allies, and the greater use of mechanical weapons instead of infantry. This latter issue was the subject of intense debate within the British army itself, with traditionalists like Haig preferring the massed infantry and artillery approach, while proponents of air power (Chief of Air Staff Hugh Trenchard) and tanks (Major General Hugh Elles and Lieutenant Colonel John Fuller), naturally advancing their ideas on the proper employment of new military technology.
Much of this debate was occurring above the heads of the New Zealand Division. This is not to suggest that they had been idle since being instrumental in halting the German push to Amiens. While other British and French units were engaged in halting further German offensive efforts in the northern sector near Ypres in the Battle of the Lys, and in the southern sector near the River Aisne, the New Zealand Division was actively involved in patrolling and training. Some battalions would hold the line they had won in March-April, while others rotated from the front line were involved in increasingly complex training. Chris Pugsley identifies this intensive training regime.
“Emphasis was on physical training, bayonet fighting, range work and live firing platoon and company attacks ‘embracing principles of mutual support and the use of the Lewis Gun and Rifle Grenades'. Platoon commanders were given tactical problems at their level, such as ‘Taking over a section of a position where the situation is obscure and garrisoned by a mixture of many Units in a disorganised condition.' The aim was to develop ‘initiative and leadership of the Platoon and Section leaders, especially as regards use of ground, control and direction of fire and quick decision in dealing with situations', and to instil in everyone in the division ‘the marked superiority of the New Zealand soldier in any kind of fighting'.”
When up in the line, the New Zealanders were constantly involved in secretive night patrols to determine the nature and strength of their opposition, or engaging in raids to seize control of German trenches around Rossignol Wood. Ormond Burton provides an evocative description of the tension of night-time patrolling. He also depicts the action in which Clarence Courtney was killed.
“On the 22nd (July) 1st and 2nd Otago (Courtney's unit) and 1st Auckland attacked again. To clear the way for the Otago attack a sergeant crawled out to the enemy wire and a moment before the barrage was to fall exploded two trench mortar bombs and so opened the way for his bombers. A few minutes later the same man seeing the attack held up by two machine guns rushed overland and single handed shot the seven men who formed their crews. Four Germans came round the bend and rushed him. He shot all four. The attackers swept in and Slug Street, Moa and Shag trenches fell into their hands.”
This description is interesting, in that it shows how the role of NCO leadership was often critical in the many sharp actions. It indicates the planning and coordination of the attack, with the interplay of artillery with infantry, the innovation of using trench mortar bombs to blast holes in the wire to let through bombers for trench clearing, and the individual heroism of the sergeant in providing leadership in a dangerous situation. For this action, Sergeant Richard Travis, was awarded the Victoria Cross, to go with his Distinguished Conduct Medal and Military Medal. Unfortunately, a week after this action, he was killed in action and did not live to receive this decoration.
Once the British and French forces had blunted the German offensives (at considerable cost to both sides), the stage was set for what would become known as the “Hundred Days”, the final Allied push against the Germans that would finally force the Germans to surrender in November 1918. The first of these battles was the battle of Amiens , which began in July 1918 and continued through August. The New Zealand Division played little part in the initial exchanges in this battle, but was instrumental in the capture of the key town of Bapaume, north of Albert. From this time, the Division moved forward constantly until the November armistice.
The battle for the capture of Bapaume began on 21 August 1918, starting with the usual precisely planned artillery barrage and aided by heavy mist. The initial assault experienced little difficulty in getting forward, but met increasing resistance around Grévillers. Working in combination with tanks, both the lighter “Whippets” and the heavier Mark V, the New Zealanders were able to clear Loupart Wood, then move on towards Grévillers, surround it and consolidate their positions. By 24 August, having seized Grévillers, the Division prepared for its assault on Bapaume. It was the proven method of initial artillery assault, followed by steady movement forward, suppressing fire from machine-gun posts, sudden dashes by small groups seizing strongpoints, often capturing men and guns, working in combination with mechanical weapons such as tanks and aircraft. As Stewart points out at the end of the Battle of Bapaume:
“The battle had been no facile triumph. The enemy had indeed been retiring, but his movements up until this time had been conducted in a great measure deliberately, with marked skill and in good order. His rearguards had offered fight on positions carefully selected to give the greatest scope to well-placed machine guns supported by field artillery. The successive lines occupied were independently organised and sufficiently far behind one another to prevent troops who had carried the first from overrunning the second with their initial impetus … Fighting for time, the enemy had in many cases forced us to yield more of that priceless asset than we were disposed to yield, and he had maintained unbroken a screen behind which he had withdrawn his guns and main force.”
That “priceless asset” was the New Zealand soldier. Stewart estimates that this battle cost the Division over 2200 casualties, including more than 400 killed (including six from Papanui). However, the British Third and Fourth Armies had forced the Germans off the old Somme battlefields, inflicting considerable numbers of casualties on them, including the seizing of 270 guns and the taking of 34,000 prisoners. These were losses that the Germans could ill afford. The stage was now set for further assaults on the Hindenburg Line, where Haig hoped that the continual weight of Allied Assault would eventually compel the Germans to finally submit.
Canterbury soldiers working their way up to the front line near Grevillers on 24 August 1918. (H936, Kippenberger Military Archive).
In September, the German armies were not ready to oblige them. The Hindenburg Line was still a formidable obstacle to be overcome. It consisted of a series of inter-locking defensive systems of barbed wire and pill-boxes, with defence in depth from the creation of a number of defensive lines. Each line would have to be assaulted and held, before moving on to the next line of defence. For the New Zealand Division, their next objective was Havrincourt, one of a number of French villages that had to be seized as part of the Third Army's assault on the defences of the Hindenburg Line. The Division fought its way forward, using proven methods of infantry assault supported by artillery and armour. Pugsley, in quoting from the war diary of Brigadier Hart describing the assault on Havrincourt, claims that this is
“the story of a professional brigade doing a job that it has learned to do well – able and continuing to fight after the opposition stiffens, calling up support from its mortars and artillery to subdue strong points and then using infantry skills to fight on through. It is by now a citizen force that is indistinguishable from a Regular formation, skilled and professional at every level.”
Pugsley notes that this achievement was often bought at a cost, and that casualties were heavy among the junior leaders. He explains that this is because these junior commanders had to take the initiative when an advance was stalled, and this cost the Division heavy casualties at the section leader and platoon commander level. This is borne out by an analysis of the Papanui men who died in France in 1918. Of the twenty-two men from the district who were killed in action in 1918, eight were at the junior commander level.
In mid-September, the Division was relieved from a period of continuous front line service and withdrawn to Bapaume. Russell was not idle. The events of the recent advances were evaluated by interviewing a cross section of men from all brigades to learn about their experiences and to seek their views on what had occurred. The results of these interviews were collated and formed part of a Division conference where lessons learned from the recent assaults could be identified and embodied into training for future assaults. This practice demonstrates how professional the New Zealand Division had come, a far cry from the amateurism evident at Gallipoli.
The next major offensive in which New Zealand took place was in the Battle of Canal du Nord, which began on 27 September 1918. Using a developing pattern of attack, the New Zealand Division was committed to a moonlight advance on the Hindenburg Line on 29 September and moved ahead of its flanking British divisions. The Division's success in seizing an additional 5000 yards of wire and trenches, taking over 1400 prisoners, many machine guns and artillery, was brought at a cost of over 500 casualties. This casualty rate was ascribed in part by Russell to the inability of flanking British divisions to keep up with the New Zealand Division's rate of advance. This inability to keep up exposed New Zealand units to flank attack by determined German resisters.
On 8 October, the New Zealand Division began its customary practice of beginning its assault in darkness, starting at 4.30 a.m. The 3rd Rifle Brigade led the assault, capturing the town of Lesdain (during which Richard Corsbie was killed). The Germans counter-attacked with tanks, to be met by supporting British tanks. The role of aircraft in spotting an approaching German counter-attack, enabling the New Zealand field artillery and machine guns to break it up, showed that battles had become more complex than earlier in the war. This New Zealand success mirrored a broader Allied accomplishment. Having broken the through the Hindenburg Line and engaging in pursuit of the Germans, the Allies now scented victory.
Although these successes may have pleased the commanders, not all New Zealand soldiers were so delighted. These successes had been brought at a cost. Percy Miller expressed a distinct war-weariness in a blunt letter home.
“Our Division has never been so low in numbers before, the fighting units are only about 20 p.c. left, and very few reinforcements available. Everybody feels that the Division has had more than its fair share of stoush, and blame Bill Massey. … So long as New Zealand keeps reinforcing us, so long they will keep us up to our necks in stoush. The more men that leave NZ, the more “line” we will get. A chap can't go on for ever. I've been up the line 12 months now, and except for 10 days in hospital with my finger and my leave, I have never had a spell, and have been in six “stunts” where the casualties each time averaged 40 p.c.”
For the Germans, the reality of imminent defeat was now something that their High Command had to confront. Ludendorff and Hindenburg were profoundly shocked by information that conditions within Germany had deteriorated to the extent that revolution was a distinct possibility. German Communists began to see parallels between the situation in Germany (with its economic privations and plummeting morale) and that of Russia the previous year. The German government was in fact disintegrating, and Kaiser Wilhelm was having difficulty coping with this situation. It was clear that a new government would have to be created, and manoeuvrings began to create a more democratic government in the hope that better terms for an armistice might be negotiated than could be achieved by the failing Imperial government. Approaches were made through neutral sources for the Allies to consider an armistice.
While losses sustained by the Germans in the recent battles of Canal du Nord and Cambrai had finally forced the German High Command to realise that it could not win the war, fighting still continued at the front. Many German units were disintegrating, and although individual units still fought with characteristic stubbornness, the Allied advance could not be held any longer. The New Zealand Division, withdrawn from front line duties on 12 October, continued its pattern of training and preparation for further assaults, unaware of these high level manoeuvrings. It was re-committed on 23 October 1918 and seized German positions by the Ecaillon River . Its final push was in the Battle of the Sambre River , where its last major action was the liberation of the fortress town of Le Quesnoy . Lieutenant Leslie Averill of the 3rd Rifle Brigade led an escalade of the town walls, and his men flushed out the few remaining German resisters before they surrendered. The people of Le Quesnoy have never forgotten this action and to this day continue to celebrate the actions of the New Zealand Division in liberating them from German control. Although the New Zealanders did not realise it, their war was effectively over. At 11.00 a.m. on 11 November 1918, the fighting ceased, and the greatest war in history was finally over.
Pugsley summarised the achievements on the New Zealand Division in the final push for victory in 1918.
"In the final offensive between 21 August and 6 November 1918 the New Zealand Division captured 8756 prisoners, 145 guns, three tanks and 1263 machine guns. Between 1 July and 6 November it had been the leading division for 49 of the 56 miles advanced on IV Corps' front as part of the Third Army. It had fought as the only dominion division in the Third Army from March through to the Armistice, and lacked the advantages of working in a national corps, as the Australians and Canadians did. Nevertheless, in the words of C.E.W. Bean, ‘the New Zealand Division shone wherever it went.' This had a cost: divisional casualties from 29 September to 6 November numbered 3556 including 519 dead. When it stopped fighting on 6 November 1918 the New Zealand Division numbered 11,566 out of an infantry establishment of 14,371.”
Burton O.E. The Silent Division, Angus and Robertson, 1935
Pugsley Christopher, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand , Australia and Empire in the First World War, Reed, 2004
Stewart H. The New Zealand Division 1916-1919, Whitcombe and Tombs, 1921