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Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig had always believed that a breakthrough could be made in the Ypres Salient area, but the alliance with the French had constrained him from concentrating his forces in this area. The failure of the Somme Offensive, and later the French Nivelle Offensive meant that Haig was now free to pursue the planning of an offensive in the summer of 1917. As a preliminary to a wider attempt to enlarge the Ypres Salient and create a breakthrough, it was proposed that the Messines Ridge south of Ypres be chosen as the starting point of this offensive. Haig instructed Sir Herbert Plumer to prepare a plan for the capture of the Messines Ridge, and the New Zealand Division was one of the components of the forces Plumer assembled for this purpose.
The Messines offensive was preceded by an exceptional artillery barrage of 17 days, with a particular emphasis in the latter stages on destroying the German wire. Another part of the artillery plan was preparation for counter-battery fire against German artillery that might interfere with the infantry advance. These preparations were materially assisted by the fact that the Royal Flying Corps had aerial supremacy and could use this observation to assist in the development of a sophisticated artillery fire plan. This fire plan included not only the initial barrage, but also forward movement in support of British advances and to help blunt the inevitable German counter-attacks.
Meanwhile, Russell was developing a detailed plan for the Division's assault on Messines village. As was usual, he went forward to examine the ground over which he would send his troops. He developed a modified approach to the assault by abandoning the “creeping barrage” and replacing it with a standing barrage in an arc around Messines village on both front line and support trenches, supported by a machine gun barrage. He planned for two battalions to move through and beyond the town, leaving two companies to mop up any centres of resistance. During April and May, training and preparations continued relentlessly. Detailed instructions were developed and allocated to specific companies. A large scale model of the Messines area was developed for officers to study. Platoon commanders and sergeants were called to conferences with battalion commanding officers to receive a detailed briefing on their specific role. This level of planning and preparation is in marked contrast to the approach taken at Gallipoli, and reflects both the growing professionalism of the New Zealand Division and the hard lessons learned in previous assaults.
On 7 June 1917, at 3.10am, 19 of the 21 mines exploded in a roar that it was claimed could be heard in London . Simultaneously, the artillery began its fire plan that would provide covering fire for the assaulting infantry and suppress the German artillery. Stan Stanfield described going over the top.
“We started off, 'hopped the bags' we called it, out of the trench into the open and it was just light enough to see. You could see the flash of shell as well as the smoke. You'd just blunder along and hope you don't get shot, and if you came up against something and you get shot at and get close enough, you'd shoot back. That's about all there is to it. … And if you came under heavy fire, you'd immediately take shelter in a shell hole or any bit of broken ground to size up the situation. Groups of you in twos and threes. It was basic, not to bunch …”
Percy Miller evaded the usual military censorship by asking a comrade going on leave in England to post a letter to his family. Instead of the cheery, self-censored tone of his usual letters, this communication provides us with a more detailed narrative of his experiences at Messines.
“When the mines went up we didn't wait for no command, over the top we went. The continual roar, the smoke and the flames from the bursting shells in front, the red & green SOS rockets, was what I first saw. As soon as we first went over a man a yard or two in front of me fell. My turn next I wondered & felt like taking over in a shell hole. The ground was just a mass of shell holes, with broken wire sticking out here and there. Two or 3 more fell, some groaning pitifully. We were up to the barrage now, I were entitled to take shelter in shell holes till it lifted. We were not in any sort of order, no officers leading us like you read about in the books. Officers, NCOs & men were all hopelessly mixed, but that did not matter at all, we all knew our jobs & it was a case of colonial initiative instead of imperial discipline.”
For once, everything seemed to go much as planned for the New Zealand Division. The initial assault on Messines was successful, with battalions of the Rifle Brigade moving through and beyond the village to establish defensive positions for the anticipated counter-attack while companies allocated the role of mopping up defenders completed this. The Australians on the right flank found the going more difficult due to the German gas shells, but were able to achieve their objectives. Jim Blakemore commented in 1988 on the relative ease with which the village of Messines was captured. “Mighty big guns, wheel to wheel, more than 150 Vickers machine guns – the din was something tremendous. I reckon we could have taken Messines with a wet sack … not that much opposition.”
Russell was hamstrung by the Corps' plan which required all the infantry brigades that had seized the ridge to dig in to resist the German counter-attack. It was during one of these counter-attacks that Benjamin Claridge was killed. Russell wanted to withdraw one of his brigades behind the ridge to minimise casualties from German artillery, but was overruled by Plumer and Godley. Miller commented on the consequences of this decision. “ It took us a fortnight to consolidate, & it was a very severe time. Many casualties every day, & at the end of the fortnight our nerves were completely on edge. … Every night we were deluged with gas shells, as well as HE (high explosive) & shrapnel.”
In Russell's view, this decision increased the casualty rate unnecessarily. Russell's comment when writing to James Allen, quoted by Pugsley, shows his frustration at not being able to do what he wanted to protect his men.
“I do sometimes think that a non-professional mind takes a more detached view of operations than those who have given their whole lives to the study of these problems. I suppose one ought to be content with success, but the price that one pays, though cheerfully accepted when necessary, is always a matter of careful thought, and I think we want to study economy. To have to sit down for hour after hour under heavy shelling is a severe tax on the stoutest and must mean an expenditure of nerve power. The longer men are exposed to it, the longer it takes them to recover.”
This comment reveals Russell's ongoing concern for his men's welfare. As he visited the front line in succeeding days, Russell had two close calls, when officers accompanying him were killed and wounded by a shell-burst, and Russell himself was nearly killed by a sniper, with the bullet piercing his steel helmet. Meanwhile, he and his staff analysed the battle to identify mistakes made and to improve procedures for forthcoming battles. The New Zealand Division handed over control of the areas captured on 9 June to the Australians and apart from the New Zealand Field Artillery which remained in support of the Australians, moved back into Divisional Reserve areas.
The New Zealanders' attack on Messines had been an outstanding success. The benefits of Plumer's thorough preparation and sound battle plan had enabled the British to seize an important foothold from which to support a wider attack on the Ypres Salient. Russell's tactical planning and detailed training had paid dividends, and the evolution of New Zealand soldiers from enthusiastic amateurs of 1915 to competent professionals was increasingly evident. Although suffering almost 3000 casualties in this assault, the New Zealand Division had demonstrated why it was coming to be seen as one of the most successful divisions within the British Army. The New Zealand soldiers clearly understood their role in the overall battle plan, and had the men and materiel to accomplish it. From divisional to platoon level, the value of rehearsals, clear instructions and good leadership was evident.
Burton O.E. The Silent Division, Angus and Robertson, 1935
Pugsley Christopher, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand , Australia and Empire in the First World War, Reed, 2004
Stewart H. The New Zealand Division 1916-1919, Whitcombe and Tombs, 1921
Williams E.P. A New Zealander's Diary, Cadsonbury Publications, 1998