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The New Zealanders were part of the Anzac Division whose role was to land at Gaba Tepe on the western side of the Gallipoli Peninsula, advance across the low ground and threaten Maidos on the Dardanelles Strait side of the peninsula. Unfortunately the old military adage that the plan of attack seldom survives first contact with the enemy was to be proved correct. Instead of being landed on the relatively flat area around Gaba Tepe, the Royal Navy landed the Anzacs further north near Ari Burnu, where the terrain was much more difficult. The Australians made the initial dawn assault on Sunday 25 April 1915, but as Turkish resistance stiffened, the New Zealanders were called upon. The first New Zealand unit to land mid-morning was the Auckland Battalion, followed by the Canterbury Battalion, which completed its landing by 12.30 p.m. Their role was to extend the line to the left of the First Australian Division. They made their way towards what would become known as Walker 's Ridge. Later in the afternoon, the Otago Battalion was sent up to Plugge's Plateau to support the men from Auckland.
The New Zealanders plunged ashore onto what would become known as Anzac Cove, and after that all sense of planning and command and control broke down. Having been landed in the wrong place the men were simply compelled to move forward as best they could to reinforce the Australians inland. Casualties were starting to mount, and well-concealed Turkish snipers took their toll. Consideration was given to abandoning the landing, but General Sir Ian Hamilton, the commander of the Dardanelles invasion, ordered them to hold on. (“Dig, dig, dig until you are safe” was his advice). So the troops dug in and tried to survive the attentions of the Turkish snipers and gunners. The Turks had quickly realised that the valley running inland from Ari Burnu was a main means of communication between the beach and the front line, and proceeded to shell it incessantly, so this valley was christened Shrapnel Valley . At the head of this valley was a gully that became known as Monash Gully, after the officer commanding the Australians. This was one of the main ways to get to what would become two of the most dangerous places in Gallipoli, Quinn's Post and Courtney's Post. These posts were where the Anzac and the Turkish entrenchments were only metres apart. On 2 May an attempt was made to seize Baby 700, using support from battalions from the Royal Naval Division. Originally planned for 1 May, a Turkish attack forced a postponement until the next evening. However, this attack failed due to a lack of preparation and coordination.
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For the British, Cape Helles had always been the main focus of the Dardanelles campaign. To bolster this campaign, two New Zealand brigades were removed from Anzac Cove in early May to reinforce existing British units. In the second battle of Krithia, British commanders had launched a series of unimaginative daylight frontal assaults on Turkish defences around Krithia. Two British attacks on the 6 th and 7 th had failed, but nothing had been learned. Now it was the turn of the Anzacs.at 10.30 a.m. on 8 May 1915, after a feeble artillery bombardment, the Anzacs launched themselves across an area of flat land towards the Turkish defences. Many casualties were sustained before this initial attack was halted.
After these abortive attacks, the Anzacs remained at Helles until 20 May, when they were transported back to the area now known simply as Anzac. Meanwhile, this area had been reinforced by other troops, including those of the Mounted Regiments, who had left their beloved horses in Egypt to fight as regular infantry. They were soon to be tested. During the absence of the Anzac forces at Helles, those who had remained had assiduously strengthened the defences around Russell's Top and the Nek. The Turkish commanders had decided that the Anzacs were to be removed from the peninsula. On 19 May, a force of 40,000 Turks had been assembled and they were launched down from their trenches towards the Mounted Rifles. Carefully-sited machine guns enfiladed the Turks, supported by the continuous rifle fire from the Anzac trenches. Barbed wire impeded the Turks' efforts to reach the Anzac trenches and the few Turks that reached there were summarily shot or bayoneted. Time and again the Turks flung themselves at the Anzac line, to be halted by the intense machine-gun fire and musketry of the New Zealanders. Eventually New Zealand artillery from Howitzer Gully and shelling from ships offshore multiplied the carnage. At the end of this terrible day 3,000 Turks lay dead and dying in front of the Anzac trenches. On 24 May, a 6-hour armistice was arranged to enable the dead of both sides to be buried.
The terraces below Quinns Post, one of the most dangerous areas on the Gallipoli peninsula.(E.S. Gibson photograph, Canterbury Museum, 1989.44.1)
The stalemate had to be broken somehow, and a plan was developed to achieve this. The New Zealanders were to have a leading role in this plan. Sir Ian Hamilton sought and received reinforcements and devised a plan in which two columns would advance on to the Sari Bair Range, aiming to capturing the key high points of Chunuk Bair, Hill Q, and Hill 971 (Koja Chemen Tepe) during the night of 6-7 August. A diversionary attack by the Australians would divert Turkish attention from this attack. At dawn on the 7th, an attack initiated by the New Zealanders from Chunuk Bair combined with a diversionary Australian attack from Russell's Top against the heavily fortified Turkish position at the Nek would complete the capture of the whole ridge as far as Hill 971.
It was an overly complicated plan that did not work out. The Mounted Rifles had reconnoitred the area at the base of the Sari Bair Range north of Anzac. On the night of 6/7 August, they led a silent and successful attack, clearing this area of the Turks as a preliminary for the attack on Chunuk Bair. However, the coordination of the forces necessary for a successful dawn assault did not eventuate. The time required to make a noiseless night approach through tangled ravines and precipices meant that units such as the Canterbury Battalion did not arrive when and where they were expected. Cecil Malthus (whose book An Anzac Perspective, is a literate personal account of the campaign) goes into some detail rebutting the criticism of later historians for the failure of units to arrive at dawn at Rhododendron Spur as demanded by Hamilton 's plan.
Consequently the attack on Chunuk Bair, which depended on speed to seize their objectives and be reinforced in strength before the Turks could respond, bogged down. The New Zealand forces that reached Chunuk Bair unscathed were enfiladed from Hill Q and later assaulted by waves of Turkish infantry determined to seize back control of this vital point. Diaries and recollections of this battle reveal its desperate nature. Percy Williams was one of the Canterbury soldiers who reached the summit in time to defend against the inevitable counter-attack.
“Soon, however, … bullets were almost continuously splashing into it. I dug on until I groaned and cursed in the very agony of my endeavour. My limbs ached, and my temple throbbed; I was scorched with thirst, without the wherewithal to slake it. …. For myself, I was done, and in the shallow dugout lay gasping and sick.”
Many years later, Vic Nicholson recalled that frantic struggle.
“The bayonet fighting seemed to last weeks; I suppose it was only minutes. No one likes bayonets, and the Turks seemed to like them less than us. I don't remember any charges. It was all stand and defend with the bayonet, just a mad whirl. In the back of my head I could hear the words, ‘Get the bastard before he gets you. Get him or he'll get you!' That was the fact of the matter. I don't remember bayonets going in. Perhaps I shut my eyes. I don't know who I killed and who I didn't.”
Colonel William Malone, the Wellingtons' inspirational leader at Quinn's Post tried to establish some form of defence and led bayonet sorties to drive the Turks back, but he was killed by friendly artillery fire during this action. Eventually, the exhausted Anzacs were relieved by English battalions on 10 August, and the Turks staged a powerful counter-attack that finally swept the inexperienced English troops off Chunuk Bair.
The failure of the Sari Bair Offensive ensured the failure of the whole Gallipoli campaign. Hamilton 's plan was too complex and relied on exact timing that took no account of the terrain. Insufficient reconnaissance compounded this problem. The successful English landing at Suvla was not exploited due to weak leadership, and those English troops that did arrive to reinforce the New Zealanders on the high ground arrived too late and were too inexperienced to contend with determined Turkish counterattacks. The leadership of the Turkish commanders, and courage and resilience of the Turks in defending their homeland so vigorously also explains the failure of this offensive.
Attacks continued to be mounted in this area throughout August. One of these attacks was to seize a hill designated “Hill 60”, starting on 21 August 1915. This task fell to a mixture of British and Anzac units, including the Canterbury and Otago Mounted Rifles. Despite being “weakened by dysentery and disease” they charged across an area 800 metres wide swept by Turkish fire and climbed up towards the top of Hill 60 and seized the first enemy trench. This attack cost the Canterburys 58% and the Otagos 65% respectively of their effective soldiers. Further attacks on 27 August led to more casualties Bill East recalled that:
“I was next to a Canterbury Mounted man who'd been in the battle of Chunuk Bair in August. I said to him, ‘What sort of outfit is this?' He said, ‘Not nearly as bad as Chunuk Bair.' I said, ‘It's bad enough.' Next thing I knew there was enfilade fire from down our trench from the big .75 guns to our right. I don't know what happened to the Canterbury man – he's probably still over there on Hill 60 – but I got sprayed with pellets. I got them in the lung. I had to drag myself away, feeling weaker all the time … As I crawled away from Hill 60 I met three or four of our fellows wounded, badly wounded, singing out for water. I threw them my water bottle. There were four of them. Badly wounded. Suffering. And I couldn't do anything.”
In September, the exhausted Anzacs were finally withdrawn to Mudros for some rest and recovery. Some had already been there. Andrew Macfarlane wrote a letter to his mother from Lemnos describing the men who have been evacuated from Gallipoli.
“There are not many boys who went away left. It makes one weep to see them that are left nothing but mere shadows and yet they are fit for duty more like a grave; They call this a rest camp you can guess the rest because I can't fail to see where the rest comes in for those who have been fighting so long.”
Despite the exhaustion and lack of proper rest facilities, some of the Anzacs were returned to Gallipoli in November. By then Hamilton had been sacked by Kitchener and a decision had been taken to evacuate the peninsula. Ironically, given the muddle and the lack of planning and leadership that had characterised much of the campaign, the Anzac withdrawal was conducted in great secrecy and without a single casualty on 20 December. The troops were taken first to Lemnos and then later to Egypt to await their next assignment.
Malthus Cecil, Armentiéres and the Somme, Reed, 2002.
Pugsley Christopher, The Anzac Experience: New Zealand , Australia and Empire in the First World War, Reed, 2004
Stowers Richard, Bloody Gallipoli, David Bateman, 2005.
Waite Fred, The New Zealanders at Gallipoli, Whitcombe and Tombes, 1919.
Williams E.P. A New Zealander's Diary, Cadsonbury Publications, 1998